THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT FOR THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (1990-1995)

The war in the former Yugoslavia had a significant impact on the relations between the USA and the EU, as it became a kind of a test for them in the new geopolitical situation after the Cold War. For the first time since the end of World War II, Washington decided not to become involved in solving an important conflict on the Old Continent. The Americans left the problem of the former Yugoslavia to be solved by the Europeans in order to see whether they were up to the task.

Initially, there were no deep divergences in approach between the United States and the European Community over their policy towards the former Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1991 the policy of Brussels and Washington towards Belgrade was based on the same principles, which included support for democracy, dialogue, human rights, market reforms, and unity. The Americans declared their full support for the EC's efforts to mediate a peaceful resolution to the Yugoslav crisis. But the numerous initiatives taken by the EC, such as the troika mission, Brioni agreement, peace conference or sanctions, did not bring about stability in the former Yugoslavia. While in 1991 the United States kept a distance, and viewed the activities of the EC as a test of Brussels' ability to tackle a problem on its own, then in 1992 the result of this test was known. It was clear that the EC was not up to the task. However, the Americans decided that their interests involved in resolving the conflict in the former Yugoslavia did not justify their engagement. As James Baker put it: "we do not have a dog in this fight".

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia showed an important feature of the relations between Brussels and Washington after the Cold War. It turned out that the US and the EC disagreed on many issues of major importance. This manifested itself for the first time in January 1992, when, unlike Brussels, Washington refused to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. Later, when the problem of recognition of Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina arose, the Yugoslav crisis became an occasion to improve the transatlantic relations. There were different possible scenarios, but both the Europeans, as well as the Americans made efforts to avoid any divergences this time. It was not very easy. Unlike the EC, pressed by Greece, which strongly objected to recognizing Macedonia, Washington was eager to take such a step. The Americans also pressed for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Eventually, this time the US and the EC succeeded in manifesting the appearance of unity in their policy towards the former Yugoslavia: both the United States and the EC recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the Americans agreed to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, and decided not to recognize Macedonia.

On May 1, 1993 Secretary of State Warren Christopher came to Europe to promote the American lift and strike initiative. Its aim was to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and to use air strikes against Bosnian Serbs. The Americans argued that the embargo should be lifted so that the Muslims could get weapons which would allow them to defend themselves. Whereas some Americans considered lifting the arms embargo as a cost-free way for the United States to have an effect on the war, the Europeans, in particular the French and the British who had their peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, vigorously opposed the idea, which, they argued, would not only lead to the escalation of the conflict, but would also expose the peacekeeping forces to Serb reprisals. The Americans, who consistently refused to send their soldiers to Bosnia, were not exposed to a similar risk. Finally, the Europeans refused to accept the lift and strike initiative, which was like "a strong slap in the face to Clinton" and proved that the US could not count on automatic support for their proposals from the Europeans. Regardless of the Europeans' opinion, the American Congress voted for unilateral lifting of the embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. At this point the decision of President Bill Clinton was of crucial importance. Eventually, he decided that the United States should not unilaterally lift the embargo.

Serious differences arose between the EC and the US over peace plans for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In March 1992 the Lisbon Agreement (also known as Lisbon Plan or Cutileiro Plan), supported by the EC, was initially accepted by the Muslims but finally Alija Izetbegovia rejected the plan. Some put the blame for the failure of the plan on the Americans. A similar scheme, in which the EC supported peace proposals treated reluctantly by the Americans, was to be repeated some months later, but in case of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan the differences between Washington and Brussels were sharper.

It was a difficult time in the relations between Washington and Brussels. In Europe the American lift and strike initiative was rejected, and the blame for the fiasco of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was partly put on the United States. At such a moment, on the US initiative, France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States put forward the Joint Action Plan. The EC was not even mentioned in this document. According to David Owen it was like "a slap in the face for European Political Cooperation in the foreign policy field" . The aim of the Joint Action Plan was to help extinguish the terrible war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to achieve a lasting and equitable settlement, but in fact the most concrete provision of the plan concerned the implementation of the so-called "safe areas", which proved to be a tragic idea in the light of the events that followed for example in Srebrenica. Some journalists wrote on the occasion of announcing the Joint Action Plan that it was the end of an era of American leadership and power in Europe.

November 1, 1993 was to bring a major breakthrough in the process of European integration, as on that day the Treaty of Maastricht came into force. It meant that the Common Foreign and Security Policy, replacing European Political Cooperation, started to function. However, it soon turned out that as far as political cooperation was concerned, no major breakthrough was achieved.

The same month, in November 1993, another initiative to end the war in the Balkans--known as the European Union Action Plan--was put forward by the EU. Anyway, as in case of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the proposal firmly supported by the EU was treated with reserve by the US and eventually failed.

A few months later the United Stated decided to become actively involved in multilateral efforts to solve the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the problem was who should they cooperate with. Accepting the EU as a partner had a lot of drawbacks. According to the Maastricht Treaty, Brussels should be represented by the so-called troika, which consisted of the state holding the presidency of the EU, the predecessor and the successor of this state. Thus, in the first half of 1994 the EU troika was to include Belgium, Greece and Germany, and in the second half of that year Greece, Germany and France. The problem was that, according to Owen, Greece was totally out of sympathy with the US policy over the Balkans and moreover, for Americans any cooperation with Europe made little sense if it excluded the British and French. Since the EU was not an attractive partner for the US, a Contact Group was established, which consisted of the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain and Germany. The EU was left on the sidelines. The establishment of the Contact Group seemed to be contrary to the Maastricht Treaty and proved that the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU was 'common' only in its name.

It was only in 1995 that the Americans decided to take the lead in the efforts to bring an end to the conflict. One of the most important arguments for changing their policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina was the fact that the Europeans were ready to withdraw their forces from UNPROFOR before winter, and in such a case the US were obliged to send in about 20 thousand soldiers, as part of NATO, to assist in that withdrawal. This would be a humiliating action.

The activities taken by the Americans in the diplomatic and military fields were of crucial importance for bringing the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end. In November 1995 a peace agreement was initialled in Dayton. It should be a subject of a different analysis whether the agreement may be considered a success. Nevertheless, it could have been welcomed by the public opinion as a common achievement of the Europeans and the Americans, but it was considered as a success of the American diplomats only, in particular of one of them, that is Richard Holbrooke. This was received with some irritation in Brussels. Carlos Westendorp from Spain, the President-in-Office of the Council at that time, put it this way: "The Union is doing many things, yet it turns out that the laurels - the prize - are carried off by others. Probably this is a matter we should consider very carefully, because what is clear is that the whole package of solutions which the American negotiator has used to achieve this opening up of the situation is a package which comes from the European Union". There was a feeling in the EU that it played a prominent role in resolving that conflict, yet the full extent of that role had not been recognized.

To sum up, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia revealed some serious differences between the US and the EC, but there was no major split between them. When the tensions between Washington and Brussels became quite visible, both the Europeans and the Americans were ready to make effort in an attempt to heal the transatlantic rift. As Henry Kissinger put it, there is something of a painful family dispute in the disagreements between the Americans and the Europeans who are bound by strong common interests, and by close historical, political, economic and cultural ties.

Conflict in the former Yugoslavia proved that Washington and Brussels needed each other. After the Cold War they faced a series of new challenges which could only be met through close transatlantic cooperation. The events in the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton Agreement continued to have impact on the relations between Washington and Brussels; however, they go beyond the scope of my research.

Stephen F. Larrabee, "Implications for transatlantic relations", [in:] Mathias Jopp (ed.) "The implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations", Chaillot Paper 17, Paris, 1994, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, www.weu.int/institute/chaillot, p. 13.
David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, Harcourt Brace & Company 1995, p. 179.
European Foreign Policy Bulletin, No. 95/256, Sept. 20, 1995, www.iue.it.
Henry Kissinger, Dyplomacja, Warszawa: Philip Wilson 1996, p. 902.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


	title: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT FOR THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (1990-1995) author: Agnieszka Orzelska publisher: Instytut Studiow Politycznych PAN Warszawa 2004 Buy online

The war in the former Yugoslavia had a significant impact on the relations between the USA and the EU, as it became a kind of a test for them in the new geopolitical situation after the Cold War. For the first time since the end of World War II, Washington decided not to become involved in solving an important conflict on the Old Continent. The Americans left the problem of the former Yugoslavia to be solved by the Europeans in order to see whether they were up to the task. Initially, there were no deep divergences in approach between the United States and the European Community over their policy towards the former Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1991 the policy of Brussels and Washington towards Belgrade was based on the same principles, which included support for democracy, dialogue, human rights, market reforms, and unity. The Americans declared their full support for the EC's efforts to mediate a peaceful resolution to the Yugoslav crisis. But the numerous initiatives taken by the EC, such as the troika mission, Brioni agreement, peace conference or sanctions, did not bring about stability in the former Yugoslavia. While in 1991 the United States kept a distance, and viewed the activities of the EC as a test of Brussels' ability to tackle a problem on its own, then in 1992 the result of this test was known. It was clear that the EC was not up to the task. However, the Americans decided that their interests involved in resolving the conflict in the former Yugoslavia did not justify their engagement. As James Baker put it: "we do not have a dog in this fight". The conflict in the former Yugoslavia showed an important feature of the relations between Brussels and Washington after the Cold War. It turned out that the US and the EC disagreed on many issues of major importance. This manifested itself for the first time in January 1992, when, unlike Brussels, Washington refused to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. Later, when the problem of recognition of Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina arose, the Yugoslav crisis became an occasion to improve the transatlantic relations. There were different possible scenarios, but both the Europeans, as well as the Americans made efforts to avoid any divergences this time. It was not very easy. Unlike the EC, pressed by Greece, which strongly objected to recognizing Macedonia, Washington was eager to take such a step. The Americans also pressed for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Eventually, this time the US and the EC succeeded in manifesting the appearance of unity in their policy towards the former Yugoslavia: both the United States and the EC recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the Americans agreed to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, and decided not to recognize Macedonia. On May 1, 1993 Secretary of State Warren Christopher came to Europe to promote the American lift and strike initiative. Its aim was to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and to use air strikes against Bosnian Serbs. The Americans argued that the embargo should be lifted so that the Muslims could get weapons which would allow them to defend themselves. Whereas some Americans considered lifting the arms embargo as a cost-free way for the United States to have an effect on the war, the Europeans, in particular the French and the British who had their peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, vigorously opposed the idea, which, they argued, would not only lead to the escalation of the conflict, but would also expose the peacekeeping forces to Serb reprisals. The Americans, who consistently refused to send their soldiers to Bosnia, were not exposed to a similar risk. Finally, the Europeans refused to accept the lift and strike initiative, which was like "a strong slap in the face to Clinton" and proved that the US could not count on automatic support for their proposals from the Europeans. Regardless of the Europeans' opinion, the American Congress voted for unilateral lifting of the embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. At this point the decision of President Bill Clinton was of crucial importance. Eventually, he decided that the United States should not unilaterally lift the embargo. Serious differences arose between the EC and the US over peace plans for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In March 1992 the Lisbon Agreement (also known as Lisbon Plan or Cutileiro Plan), supported by the EC, was initially accepted by the Muslims but finally Alija Izetbegovia rejected the plan. Some put the blame for the failure of the plan on the Americans. A similar scheme, in which the EC supported peace proposals treated reluctantly by the Americans, was to be repeated some months later, but in case of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan the differences between Washington and Brussels were sharper. It was a difficult time in the relations between Washington and Brussels. In Europe the American lift and strike initiative was rejected, and the blame for the fiasco of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was partly put on the United States. At such a moment, on the US initiative, France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States put forward the Joint Action Plan. The EC was not even mentioned in this document. According to David Owen it was like "a slap in the face for European Political Cooperation in the foreign policy field" . The aim of the Joint Action Plan was to help extinguish the terrible war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to achieve a lasting and equitable settlement, but in fact the most concrete provision of the plan concerned the implementation of the so-called "safe areas", which proved to be a tragic idea in the light of the events that followed for example in Srebrenica. Some journalists wrote on the occasion of announcing the Joint Action Plan that it was the end of an era of American leadership and power in Europe. November 1, 1993 was to bring a major breakthrough in the process of European integration, as on that day the Treaty of Maastricht came into force. It meant that the Common Foreign and Security Policy, replacing European Political Cooperation, started to function. However, it soon turned out that as far as political cooperation was concerned, no major breakthrough was achieved. The same month, in November 1993, another initiative to end the war in the Balkans--known as the European Union Action Plan--was put forward by the EU. Anyway, as in case of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the proposal firmly supported by the EU was treated with reserve by the US and eventually failed. A few months later the United Stated decided to become actively involved in multilateral efforts to solve the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the problem was who should they cooperate with. Accepting the EU as a partner had a lot of drawbacks. According to the Maastricht Treaty, Brussels should be represented by the so-called troika, which consisted of the state holding the presidency of the EU, the predecessor and the successor of this state. Thus, in the first half of 1994 the EU troika was to include Belgium, Greece and Germany, and in the second half of that year Greece, Germany and France. The problem was that, according to Owen, Greece was totally out of sympathy with the US policy over the Balkans and moreover, for Americans any cooperation with Europe made little sense if it excluded the British and French. Since the EU was not an attractive partner for the US, a Contact Group was established, which consisted of the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain and Germany. The EU was left on the sidelines. The establishment of the Contact Group seemed to be contrary to the Maastricht Treaty and proved that the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU was 'common' only in its name. It was only in 1995 that the Americans decided to take the lead in the efforts to bring an end to the conflict. One of the most important arguments for changing their policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina was the fact that the Europeans were ready to withdraw their forces from UNPROFOR before winter, and in such a case the US were obliged to send in about 20 thousand soldiers, as part of NATO, to assist in that withdrawal. This would be a humiliating action. The activities taken by the Americans in the diplomatic and military fields were of crucial importance for bringing the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end. In November 1995 a peace agreement was initialled in Dayton. It should be a subject of a different analysis whether the agreement may be considered a success. Nevertheless, it could have been welcomed by the public opinion as a common achievement of the Europeans and the Americans, but it was considered as a success of the American diplomats only, in particular of one of them, that is Richard Holbrooke. This was received with some irritation in Brussels. Carlos Westendorp from Spain, the President-in-Office of the Council at that time, put it this way: "The Union is doing many things, yet it turns out that the laurels - the prize - are carried off by others. Probably this is a matter we should consider very carefully, because what is clear is that the whole package of solutions which the American negotiator has used to achieve this opening up of the situation is a package which comes from the European Union". There was a feeling in the EU that it played a prominent role in resolving that conflict, yet the full extent of that role had not been recognized. To sum up, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia revealed some serious differences between the US and the EC, but there was no major split between them. When the tensions between Washington and Brussels became quite visible, both the Europeans and the Americans were ready to make effort in an attempt to heal the transatlantic rift. As Henry Kissinger put it, there is something of a painful family dispute in the disagreements between the Americans and the Europeans who are bound by strong common interests, and by close historical, political, economic and cultural ties. Conflict in the former Yugoslavia proved that Washington and Brussels needed each other. After the Cold War they faced a series of new challenges which could only be met through close transatlantic cooperation. The events in the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton Agreement continued to have impact on the relations between Washington and Brussels; however, they go beyond the scope of my research. Stephen F. Larrabee, "Implications for transatlantic relations", [in:] Mathias Jopp (ed.) "The implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations", Chaillot Paper 17, Paris, 1994, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, www.weu.int/institute/chaillot, p. 13. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, Harcourt Brace & Company 1995, p. 179. European Foreign Policy Bulletin, No. 95/256, Sept. 20, 1995, www.iue.it. Henry Kissinger, Dyplomacja, Warszawa: Philip Wilson 1996, p. 902. BIBLIOGRAPHY